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2Why a management concept fails to support managers’ work: The case of
the ‘core competence of a corporation’
With respect to teaching there is no more important topic than the question of the way
in which genuine concepts are formed.  John Dewey1
Abstract
Management concepts are both products and instruments of abstractive thinking. This
conceptual paper discusses the relationship between different forms of abstraction and
the practical relevance of management concepts. It focuses on the difference between
empirical and theoretical abstractions. The former serves categorization while the latter
serves explaining and constructing. We argue that this distinction can partly explain the
difficulties managers face when using the management concepts researchers have
introduced. To substantiate our claim, we analyse the creation and use of the concept of
a corporation’s core competence. The analysis shows how, in this case, a theoretical
abstraction of a novel strategic principle turned into an empirical  abstraction, which in
practice has triggered unproductive attempts to categorize existing competencies rather
than create new ones.
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3Introduction
M3: ‘Well… First of all, we’ve all, at some point in our history [in top management],
probably participated in defining core competence. And I was a chairman in one of these
groups in our previous organization [structure], and we wrote a hell of a lot of papers.
And what have we learned? At some point we defined project management and contract
negotiations as our core competencies, and now Kate and John have outlined yet another
list for this, and Peter already wanted some changes to its wordings.’
 In the excerpt above, the manager of a large road building company is making critical
observations on the management team’s effort to create a competence strategy for the
firm. The managers had chosen to use the concept of core competence as an instrument
in  this  endeavour,  but  were  not  too  happy  with  the  result.  The  motivation  for  this
conceptual paper arose from observing the frustration of the managers, who tried to apply
the concept and felt that their attempts amounted to nothing but futile piles of paper.
 In recent years, scholars have intensively debated the relevance of management
research for practice (Ghoshal, 2005; Hodgkinson et al., 2001; Mohrman et al., 2001;
Nicolai and Seidl, 2010; Rynes et al., 2007; Starkey and Madan, 2001; Syed et al., 2009).
It has been suggested that the lack of collaboration between researchers and practitioners
may partly explain the deficient practical relevance (Boyer, 1990; Van de Ven, 2007).
Argyris (1980) has argued that the norms of rigour of ‘normal science’ prevent
4researchers from performing emancipatory searches for new alternatives that practitioners
would need. Ghoshal (2005) argues that management theories that are reductionist and
partial are not only irrelevant, but detrimental to good management practices. In this
article, we argue, partly following Ghoshal’s line of thought, that the practical value of
the management concepts that researchers present depends on the nature of the abstraction
and generalization processes through which the concepts have been produced. To analyse
these we apply Ilyenkov’s (1982) and Davydov’s (1990) theory of two fundamentally
different forms of abstracting and generalizing. This theory argues that concepts are
generalized representations of reality, which are produced through certain epistemic
actions of abstracting and generalizing. When created, they can be used as instruments
for carrying out similar epistemic actions in various contexts. The theory further holds
that the epistemic actions of empirical abstraction differ fundamentally from those of
theoretical abstraction, and produce representations of reality with remarkably different
value as instruments. To demonstrate this, we analyse the evolution and use of the concept
of the core competence of a corporation, presented by Prahalad and Hamel (1990) 2, from
the point of view of the actions of abstracting used in its creation and application.
 We will first explain this theory and then use it to examine the development and use
of the concept of the core competence of a corporation. We will first shortly describe the
history of the concept and its place in strategy theory. Then we will analyse the processes
of abstraction that are visible in: 1) the strategy processes of the firms that Prahalad and
5Hamel used as case examples, 2) Prahalad and Hamel’s explanation of their theory and
their recommendations for managers, and 3) the further elaborations of the concept within
management literature. Then we will present a review of the literature on the practical
uses of the concept, and show an example of how managers use it in a company. At the
end, we will discuss the implications of the observations for the debate on the practical
relevance of management knowledge.
Two forms of abstraction and generalization: empirical and theoretical
A concept can be understood as a generalized representation (be it internal and mental or
external and material) of some aspect or part of reality produced through a sequence of
the epistemic actions of abstracting and generalizing. When created, the concept functions
as a resource and instrument for carrying out similar operations of abstracting and
generalizing in new contexts (Leontyev, 1990: IV). There are, however, qualitatively
different methods of abstracting and generalizing that produce qualitatively different
kinds of generalized representations, that is, different kinds of concepts with varying
functionalities as intellectual instruments. Davydov (1990: 86-109) highlights the
difference between empirical abstraction that produces formal, classificatory concepts,
and theoretical abstraction that produces models or principles that allow one to mentally
reproduce the interacting phenomena that make up a holistic system. We explain this
difference in the following.
6 In a study of the ways in which people think, the psychologist A. Luria (1976: 55)
presented a picture of an axe, a tree, and a saw to the experimental participants in a remote,
unindustrialized area in Uzbekistan and asked them which two of the objects belong
together. Most of the participants who had attended school answered that the axe and the
saw go together because they are both tools. They compared the objects and found a
feature that was common to the two but which the third lacked. An uneducated peasant,
Rakmat, however, answered: You need all of them, you need a saw and an axe to cut a
tree. Instead of categorizing objects on the basis of similar features, he focused on the
functional connections between the objects in a peasant’s typical work action. Such
functional connections between the qualities of objects can, however, only be found in
their mutual interactions in practical activity or in experiments. According to Davydov
(1990: 88-89), identifying such functional connections is the first, rudimentary form of
theoretical abstraction that establishes relationships between qualities of objects, which
cannot immediately be perceived, but appear in their interaction within a system.
 The philosopher Spinoza (1677) was the first to point out this difference between
forms of abstraction when he discussed the proper way of defining a concept. According
to Spinoza, the fundamental properties of things are not understood as long as their
essence, that is, the principle of their evolution or production is not known. If this is the
case… ‘there is necessarily a perversion of the succession of ideas, which should reflect
the succession of nature, and we go far astray from our object.’ (Spinoza, 1677: 2. part,
72. Chapter)  He continues: ‘For instance, a circle should, according to this rule, be defined
as follows: the figure described by any line whereof one end is fixed and the other free.’
That is to say, a pair of compasses denotes the proper definition of a circle because it
provides the principle of producing circles of any sizes and quality; also circles never
created before.
 Empirical abstractions are names of sets of objects or phenomena. They provide the
criteria for subsuming objects into specific sets on the basis of their externally observable
similarities and differences. The concepts based on such abstraction typically form a
hierarchy of sets with an increasing scope and a decreasing amount of specifications. In
this form of abstraction, objects are viewed in their givenness as independent entities,
with fixed qualities in a specific time and place, without paying attention to the systemic
relationships of interaction and the processes of their emergence and change. This view
has been criticized by Whitehead (1997: 51) as a fallacy of misplaced concreteness, as
the abstractions ‒ the names of objects ‒ are confounded with concrete reality that actually
consists of processes rather than static entities. Theoretical abstractions, on the other hand,
focus on the systemic relationships of interaction between diverse objects in which
individual objects manifest properties that they do not have outside the system. (Ilyenkov,
1982; Davydov 1990: 90-91). Such system-forming relationships of interplay and
complementarity are revealed through historical analysis and practical
experimentation. Rather than verbal definitions, theoretical concepts exist
8as methods and models that are used as intellectual instruments in special kinds of
thinking actions. According to Davydov (1990: 91) “to have a [theoretical] concept of a
given object means to be able to mentally reproduce its content ‒ to construct it”. In other
words, it means an ability to reproduce the development of an object or phenomenon that
the concept denotes in all its systemic and functional interconnections. Theoretical
abstractions are generative in the sense that they enable moving mentally in time from the
here and now to the past and to the possibilities of the further evolution and change of the
system by revealing the principle of its functioning and development. These principles
can be applied in various contexts as instruments of design, experimentation, and
learning.
     The process of theoretical abstraction that leads to a theoretical concept starts from a
contradictory situation, which forces one to question a prevalent belief or practice. Such
a situation emerges when the development of some element of a complex system lags
behind the development of the other elements, creating an inner contradiction within the
system. A new theoretical concept can be understood as a principle of resolving such a
contradiction through a new way of mediating the interplay between the opposites of the
contradiction (Ilyenkov, 2007). Such a new structure emerges typically as a local solution
to a general problem. As Ilyenkov (1982: 83-84, emphases in original) notes:
‘Any new improvement of labour, every new mode of man’s action in
production, before becoming generally accepted and recognised, first
9emerges as a certain deviation from previously accepted and codified
norms. Having emerged as an individual exception from the rule in the
labour of one or several men, the new form is then taken over by others,
becoming in time a new universal norm. If the new norm did not originally
appear in this exact manner, it would never become a really universal form,
but would exist merely in fantasy, in wishful thinking.’
 The concept of the core competence of a corporation can be seen as such a new way
of mediating between contradictory requirements, developed first as a local solution to a
historically evolved, increasingly general systemic problem. However, it can also be used
as a way to categorize existing competencies. In the following, we will analyse the
evolution of this concept, using the distinction between empirical and theoretical
abstraction.  After  this,  we  will  use  the  result  of  the  analysis  to  explain  the  difficulties
mangers have in using the concept as an instrument in strategic planning.
Forms of abstraction and generalization involved in the creation and use of
the concept of the core competence of a corporation
Core competence: an appealing but difficult notion
Prahalad and Hamel’s (1990) theory of competence-based corporate strategy was brought
to widespread public attention in their article ‘The Core Competence of the Corporation’
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). It offered an appealing strategy tool to implement the
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resource-based view (RBV) of the firm in strategy-making (Peteraf, 1993; Priem and
Butler, 2001; Wernerfelt, 1984). Prahalad and Hamel defined core competencies as ‘the
collective learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production
skills and integrate streams of technologies’ (1990: 81). The concept is still one of the
most used managerial tools in strategy-making (Nicolai and Dautwiz, 2010; Rigby and
Bilodeau, 2015). It ‘arrived at a time when executives in large corporates were aware that
many of the traditional portfolio approaches were inadequate and it offered a compelling
rationale for corporate strategy decisions, resource allocation and competition.’ (Clark,
2000: 115) However, despite numerous post-hoc accounts of successful firms’ core
competencies, studies have shown that attempts to apply the concept in strategy-making
tend to result in lists of competencies with no clear idea of what is ‘distinctive’ or ‘core’
about them (Clark, 2000; Javidan, 1998).
The emergence of the new integrative strategy concept
The history of the concept of the core competence of a corporation began in the strategy
processes of a number of progressive firms that had focused their developmental efforts
on a few broadly applicable competencies. Prahalad and Hamel paid attention to the
success of these firms and studied their strategies. No first-hand data is generally available
from the actual abstraction and generalization processes involved in the firms’ strategy-
making, through which these firms defined the competencies they decided to develop and
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concentrate on, but Prahalad and Hamel’s presentation of them allows us to infer some
features of these processes.
 According to Prahalad and Hamel (1990: 80), the top management of the Japanese
company NEC, for instance, conducted a careful analysis of developments in the
information  technology sector  in  the  early  1970s.  They  saw that:  1)  computing  would
evolve from large mainframes to distributed processing, 2) components would evolve
from simple integrated circuits into very large scale integration, and 3) communications
would evolve from mechanical cross-bar exchange to complex digital systems [integrated
services digital network ISDN]. Thus computing, communications, and component
businesses would overlap, presenting enormous opportunities for companies that had the
competencies to serve all three markets. Thus the managers concluded that
semiconductors would be NEC’s most important ‘core product’, and that the firm’s
success would hinge upon the competencies of producing semiconductors and integrating
systems.
 Prahalad and Hamel (1990) also found other similar cases, in which firms concentrated
their developmental resources on the competencies that they saw as the core of their future
business by coalescing relevant partial competencies from the corporation’s various units.
These firms also entered into strategic alliances in order to build competencies rapidly
and at low costs, and accelerated the learning and refinement of the core competencies by
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increasing the diversity of their market experience through OEM (original equipment
manufacturer) relationships.
 The descriptions of these cases highlight three features of the processes of abstracting
and generalizing in the firms’ strategic planning. Firstly, the firms’ managers had carried
out thorough analyses of the ongoing changes in and the probable future of the activities
of their  potential  clients,  as well  as of the relevant markets and technologies.  Through
these analyses, they had identified an emerging general problem or need, which for
instance in NEC’s case, manifested itself as a contradiction between the rising need for
integrating technologies and the predominant firm structure of independent business
units. Secondly, they had developed an idea of a general principle of how to solve the
problem and meet the need, which NEC concretized in the development of a new core
product ‒ semiconductors ‒ and the related competencies, which integrated the existing
technologies and competencies of separate units of the corporation and its partner firms.
Finally, they had created processes of refining the core competence, and learned how to
apply it in varying contexts by creating a network of OEM relationships, thus recreating
the  system  of  relationships,  within  which  the  chosen  core  competencies  could  then
develop and flourish. Through these processes, the firms had abstracted the constellation
of basic functional relationships that defined their future business: the firm’s theoretical
strategy concept. We see here the hallmarks of theoretical abstraction: the focus is on
systemic relationships between diverse objects, and the historical change in these
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relationships. The way in which Prahalad and Hamel highlight, for example, the
importance of hybrid solutions and a strategic architecture, hints at a further hallmark of
theoretical thinking; the construction of an object or process that unites contradictory
processes.
Prahalad and Hamel’s abstraction and generalization process and the creation of
the core competence concept
It can be argued that the model of core competence-based competition that Prahalad and
Hamel (1990: 82) present, based on their analysis of the strategies of the innovative and
successful case firms, is a theoretical abstraction of a general principle of resolving the
historically evolved contradiction between the prevalent business unit-based strategic
thinking and the increasing pressure for investment in technology and product
development in the rapid evolution of technologies and markets in globalized
competition. Prahalad and Hamel support their argument by giving examples of firms that
had missed essential opportunities by holding on to the prevailing strategy approach.
 However, when discussing, in their article, how firms can create a core competence-
based strategy, Prahalad and Hamel shift the focus from an analysis of emerging general
problems and their local solution principles to the identification of core competencies
among a firm’s existing competencies. They advise managers to look for competencies
that (a) ‘provide potential access to a wide variety of markets’, (b) ‘make a significant
contribution to the customer benefits of the end product’, and (c) ‘are difficult for
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competitors to imitate’ (1990:83). It is important to notice what happens here from the
point of view of generalizing. The list still hints at the theoretical strategy concepts that
the case firms had created, but these attributes of ‘coreness’ are, however, presented as if
they were fixed qualities of some separate competencies and could exist and be
determined by focusing on competencies as such without an analysis of the relationships
between evolving new constellations of technologies and markets and the firm’s
resources. This is a case of the ‘fallacy of misplaced concretes’, as a complex set of
relationships and a temporal process is presented as fixed properties of isolated objects ‒
the competencies.
 Prahalad and Hamel’s model abstracts the general features of the outcomes of the
abstraction and generalization processes carried out by the case firms instead of the
method and process of the firms’ strategy-making. Therefore, their theory serves the
selection of core competencies from a set of existing competencies rather than the creation
of a new, broadly applicable competence. The essential content of a core competence of
a corporation can, however, only be determined as a solution to an aggravating
contradiction within the system of relationships that form the context of a corporation’s
business activity. Thus, this form of empirical generalization, objectified in a verbal
definition, paradoxically turns managers’ attention away from the changing constellation
of actual relationships in their business context and moves it towards building abstract
taxonomies of competencies. What Prahalad and Hamel fail to abstract and generalize
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from their case data are the methods for identifying the ‘great variety of markets’ relevant
to a corporation’s business, the methods for determining ‘customer benefit’, and the
methods for creating ‘difficult-to-imitate’ competencies. Therefore, the concept they have
created does not help managers identify a strategic problem in their business situation
which a new, broadly applicable competence would solve. In empirical abstraction,
‘every property can become a basis for generalization and a means of distinguishing
appropriate groups of objects – that is, any purely external properties can become the
content of a concept.’ (Davydov, 1990: 24). Thus, we argue that this feature of empirical
abstraction explains the difficulties that managers who follow Prahalad and Hamel’s
advice have in reaching an agreement on the essential core competencies of their firm.
The use of the core competence concept as an instrument in practice
According to studies on the use of the core competence concept in practice, Prahalad &
Hamel’s theory has led firms to try to identify and list their core competencies. However,
instead of discovering ‘hard-to-imitate’ competencies, many organizations find it difficult
to distinguish their lists of potential core competencies from similar lists that they imagine
their competitors might construct (Eden & Ackerman, 2000: 15). Nicolai and Dautwiz
(2010) studied the use of the core competence concept in a large German company that
operates in over 50 countries and can be regarded as a ‘heavy adopter’ of the approach.
The 44 interviews with the company’s top managers, who were familiar with the concept
and had used it actively, generated a total of 112 references to different core
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competencies, the majority of which was mentioned only once by a single manager. Even
more interestingly, 77% of the core competencies mentioned gave no indication of the
company’s industry.
 In the literature, the problems of applying the idea of core competence are usually
traced back to the definition of the concept (Clark, 2000; Ljungquist, 2008, 2013; Nicolai
and Dautwiz, 2010). Thus, attempts have been made to more accurately verbally define
the concept of core competence and to advise how to better distinguish or identify core
competence in practice (see e.g. Hafees et al., 2002; Javidan, 1998; Zubac et el., 2010).
For example, Javidan (1998) suggests a set of questions with a progressively sharpening
focus (i.e. what do we know how to do excellently; are we any better than our competitors
in what we do well; how durable is our advantage; and so forth). The process continues
as managers’ joint contemplation, in which the identified competencies are listed and
categorized. Javidan has tried to add dynamism to the process by also including future-
oriented questions, which does not, however, alter the basic classificatory approach.
 Thus it can be argued that the attempts to solve the problems in the application of core
competence theory have focused on strengthening the empirical character of the
abstraction and generalization process rather than questioning it. There is little reference
to the problem that the core competence concept was initially created to solve, nor of how
the local managers could/should analyse their business situation and its complexities in
order to come to a diagnosis before planning the cure (as an attempt to address the latter
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question see, e.g., De Leo 1994). Without such an analysis, there is little basis for reaching
an agreement on what competencies constitute the core of the firm’s future business. This
is also obvious in the following example of the difficulties the managers of a Finnish road
building firm encountered when trying to apply the core competence concept in their
strategy process.
An example of problems in applying the concept of core competence
The discussion of this example took place in a senior management’s one-day seminar,
during which the managers jointly tried to define the core competencies of their firm in
order to create a new competence strategy. The discussion was recorded and transcribed.
It lasted for 1.5 hours and consisted of 262 speech turns by the eight participants (M1,
M2,…). The leader of the competence development team and one member of the top
management team had prepared a one-sheet draft of the strategy for the discussion.
The starting point was not to create a competence-based business strategy for the
firm, but a strategy of developing competencies. This reflects the traditional functional
division of labour in the firm, which already delineates competencies as a separate area
of responsibility. In addition, the task of creating a competence strategy was already in
the draft paper, presented as a task of defining the core competencies. First we examined
how the managers conceptualized ‘competence’ and the task of defining the firm’s core
competencies. Then we looked at the main content and topics of the discussion. The
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features that strike one’s attention at an early stage in this data are the managers’ difficulty
in drawing conclusions, and their lack of a clear working method.
 In the discussion, the managers listed and discussed competencies as if they were
specific objects, with no particular reference to how the challenges of their business could
be met through developing new competencies. The competencies the managers labelled
as ‘core’ were so general and void of specific content (e.g. ‘innovation of services’), that
they seemed to cover almost all the activities and business areas of the organization. This
is a typical difficulty in empirical generalization: general applicability of the strategy can
only be increased by distancing the competence descriptions from concrete application
situations and eliminating the specific and local features of the business substance from
the descriptions. The managers also realized this themselves:
M3: ‘…Just think, look at the list, the only thing missing is the support functions!’
M2: ‘Yes, it’s very comprehensive…’
 We identified three main topics in the discussion: (1) The level of concreteness of the
competence strategy (in order to gain applicability; 62 speech turns); (2) The definitions
of the concepts used (e.g. of core competence; 23 speech turns); and (3) The ‘names’ of
specific core competencies, and the division of responsibility for developing them (121
speech turns). Nine of the analysed speech turns were linked to two categories. Sixty-five
turns were left uncategorized, as they contained only co-coordinative talk or joking.
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 The talk concerning the level of concreteness of the competence strategy (Category 1)
concentrated on two issues. First, the managers discussed how concrete the instructions
for strengthening a selected competence should be in the strategy paper. The managers
called for concrete guidelines for actions, but they also argued that some of the
responsibility should be left for the business units to make their own concrete plans. They
argued that by giving more precise guidelines for proper implementation, they could
enhance the applicability of the strategy, but then faced difficulties in deciding what kind
of description is sufficiently accurate. Here as well, we see how the prevalent business
unit-based organization and strategy, the problems of which the core competence concept
was introduced to solve in the first place, interfered with the managers’ thinking of core
competencies. Secondly, the managers discussed the hierarchical relations between the
different strategies in the firm, which also reflects the traditional view of strategy rather
than Prahalad and Hamel’s idea of a strategic architecture. As the managers saw strategy-
making as a process of descending from general choice decisions to more specific ones,
which is a typical characteristic of the creation of empirical taxonomies, the lack of
decisions concerning the main strategies was claimed to be one cause of the problems in
creating the competence strategy.
M8: ’This is just so difficult, because it’s connected to all the other decisions to be made,
and we don’t have these decisions yet.’
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 In the discussion on the definition of the core competence concept (Category 2), the
managers  commended the  approach  in  the  strategy  draft  for  being  right  ‘if  we  look  at
theory and literature’, but noticed that it was still suggesting that the organization does
‘everything for everyone’. All in all, what the ‘core’ in core competence actually means,
was not explicitly discussed. One conceptualization that emerged in several speech turns
was that core competencies are those competencies that the firm has to keep in its own
hands for competitive advantage.
M3: ’…after all, the majority of our people don’t know what core competence means,
even if it’s defined. It means that we keep it to ourselves, we do it ourselves.’
 The managers unanimously agreed with this idea. However, from the point of view of
generalizing it is yet another feature that does not suggest anything about the content or
the developmental logic of a unique core competence.
 In the episodes of defining the specific core competencies and organizing their
development (Category 3), the participants first attempted to reformulate the wordings of
the suggested core competencies in the draft paper, and later proposed an appendix, which
would list all the activities concerning competence development in the organization to
ease the task of defining the core ones. The first attempt ran into the lack of criteria for
deciding on the choice of words, and the latter faced the difficulty of setting boundaries.
21
M8: ‘…there are quite a few [competencies], when you start to collect them like that. [It’s
hard to say] where the limits are.’
 The talk about defining specific competencies brought the customer into the discussion
for the first time. However, the idea of looking at the customer needs, to decide what
competencies are required and relevant, was soon reduced to a question of division of
responsibility in developing these, again reflecting the existing unit and project structure
of the firm:
 M1: ’… I mean, we should start looking [at this] from the point of view of the customer,
and divide the responsibility according to whom each competence belongs to…’
 At the end of the discussion, the managers returned to the idea of core competence as
one that should be kept in the organization’s own hands. This time the discussion led to
a dead end, when the managers realized how much collaboration they had with external
actors.
M3:  ‘…we take care of the tendering processes ourselves. Innovativeness we manage
ourselves. These kinds of expressions…
M1: ## ’…but we have a lot of consultants involved in it at this very moment.’
M8: ’Yes, that’s true.’
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M3 [contradicting himself]: ’Yeah, we can get help from them with everything, we have
consultants in strategy work too...’
M1: ## ’...like in the City Road [project], alone we would be lost… …And in these kinds
of projects we are definitely not alone.’
 The salient features in this discussion were its here-and-now-in-our-firm approach, and
the lack of discussion on the developments in the relevant markets and technologies or in
clients’ activities and needs. Another feature was the urge to find the general core
competence immediately, without analysing or discussing the problem that could thereby
be solved, or the method for generating the solution. Determining and defining the core
competencies was taken uncritically as the task. It is interesting and probably also
symptomatic of the reception of the core competence theory, and perhaps of other
management theories, that the managers wanted to apply the concept within their business
unit structure and current way of understanding the strategy without questioning it or
paying attention to Prahalad and Hamel’s original view of surpassing the limits of the
prevailing structure. The concept, however, loses its meaning when abstracted from the
problem that it was originally created to solve.
Discussion
Already in the 1970s, Mintzberg et al. (1976: 257) pondered the fact that the majority of
the literature on the strategic decision-making process focused on the evaluation-choice
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routine, which seemed to be far less significant than diagnosis or design in many of the
decision processes they had studied. This observation is important for our argument: the
evaluation-choice routine is based on empirical abstraction, whereas diagnosis and design
call for theoretical abstraction concerning relationships of interplay in a system. Prahalad
and Hamel (1990) presented their theory in the context of the new conditions of global
competition  and  rapid  technological  development  as  a  way  in  which  to  resolve  the
contradiction between the need for increased investment in development and the
dispersion  of  development  resources  in  the  business  unit-based  strategy.  They  found a
solution in the strategies of a number of progressive firms they had studied. The case
firms had developed their core competence-based strategies through thorough analyses
of foreseeable developments in the relationships between technologies, clients’ needs and
markets. Through a process of analysis and experimentation, each firm had abstracted an
emerging new constellation of relationships in their business contexts and a possible new
position for their firms within that constellation. Thus they had developed their idea of
the core competencies of their corporation as a theoretical abstraction of a general solution
principle that enabled them to meet a great variety of specific needs in various markets in
an expanded business context. Such a process of theoretical abstraction is not an armchair
exercise, but rather a sustained process of analysis, development, experimentation, and
learning in an expanding network of collaboration and business relationships.
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 However, when abstracting the basic structure and logic of a core competence-based
strategy, Prahalad and Hamel focused attention on a snapshot picture of the basic
elements of the outcome of the case firms’ strategy work rather than on the method the
firms had applied in it. This was a step from the theoretical abstraction processes that the
case firms had carried out towards an empirical abstraction concerning the external
features of competencies that could be classified as the firm’s core competence. Although
the case firms’ processes of theoretical abstraction can partly be traced in the Prahalad
and Hamel’s presentation, the way in which the authors present the criteria of identifying
a firm’s core competencies implies empirical abstraction and generalization. This was
further amplified in the subsequent management research on how to make the formal
definition of the concept more precise. Thus in the knowledge transfer process, the case
firm’s problems of diagnosing their strategic situation, designing a strategic architecture,
and developing a set of generally applicable new competencies to meet the foreseeable
business challenges turned into an ‘evaluation-choice routine’ of identifying the core
competencies of the firm’s existing competencies. This, however, has turned out to be
impossible in the lack of the criteria for the ‘coreness’ of competencies, which a historical
and systemic analysis of the firm’s business situation would provide.
 A theoretical abstraction of a competence-based strategy would comprise a general
method for carrying out the necessary epistemic actions to reach a theoretical abstraction
of a new strategy principle. Lacking such an intellectual tool for questioning and revising
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their current strategy practices, managers tend to take a new management science concept,
such as the core competence of a corporation, out of the contexts of its creation as a
solution to a contradictory situation and try to apply it as a universal solution in terms of
their current understanding within their existing management structure. This is evident in
our empirical example, in which the managers tried to apply the core competence concept
as a separate task of pointing out and defining the core competencies within the limits of
their predominant business unit structure, without questioning it.
Conclusions
We claim that the difference between theoretical and empirical abstraction partly explains
the practical relevance, or the lack of it, of the management theory concepts. The analysis
of the development and application of the concept of the core competence of a corporation
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) revealed that in the management theory discussion, and also
in practice, the original case firms’ theoretical abstractions concerning the evolution of
the system of technologies, markets and user needs that led them to develop new, broadly
applicable competencies, were turned into empirical abstractions that triggered
unproductive categorization of existing competencies. This happened partly because the
management researchers abstracted some general features from the progressive case
firms’ strategies rather than the methods and principles of strategy-making that they had
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applied. Thus they did not provide practising managers with a method or solution
principle for creating a core competence-based strategy for their firm.
 Management theory has a long tradition of abstracting the external features of
successful firms (Mintzberg et al. 1976) , in a ‘search for excellence’, and providing them
as models to be copied, without providing theoretical generalizations concerning the
systemic roots of the problems they have solved. Our analysis brings forth the important
difference between the nature of generality in empirical and theoretical abstraction. The
generality of a theoretical abstraction means generativity, a generally applicable principle
of solving problems of a certain kind. Instead of a here-and-now empirical generality,
generative generality manifests itself in the capacity to produce an increasing variety of
branches of new solutions through the application of the principle inherent in it. Just as
one can create an endless variety of circles with a pair of compasses, one can create a
great variety of products and applications with a theoretical abstraction of a core
competence. Such a theoretical abstraction of a principle is an instrument of redesign and
learning. In this sense, ‘there is nothing so practical as a good theory’ (Lewin, 1952, 169).
 However, a concept does not, as such, reveal the epistemic actions through which it
was created, nor those of its adequate application. A theoretical abstraction can be
interpreted and applied as an empirical one. That is what happened with the case firms’
original strategy concepts. The problems of applying the core competence concept are
thus not only created by Prahalad and Hamel’s text, which also provides material for a
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more theoretical interpretation of the case descriptions, but also by the empirical way of
thinking of the managers who apply the concept. The practical relevance of a management
science concept is not a fixed feature of the concept as such, but a feature that emerges in
the broader system of societal problem-solving. The analysis of the forms of abstraction
and  generalization  within  this  system  is  a  fruitful  way  to  study  the  possibilities  of
increasing the practical relevance of management research and of shifting researchers and
practitioners’ attention from the evaluation and choice of available solutions to the
diagnostic analysis of the problems to be solved.
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Notes
1. (1933) How we think, p. 154
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2. We use Prahalad and Hamel’s 1990 article as our main source to analyse the premises
of the theory of core competence-based competition, as it is the first and most crystallized
presentation of its main ideas.
References
Argyris C (1980) Inner contradictions of rigorous research. New York: Academic Press.
Boyer E (1990) Scholarship reconsidered: Priorities of the professoriate. Princeton, NJ: Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.
Clark DN (2000) Implementation Issues in Core Competence Strategy Making. Strategic Change 9(2):
115–127.
Davydov VV (1990) Types of Generalization in Instruction: Logical and Psychological Problems in the
Structuring of School Curricula. Reston, Virginia: National Council of Teachers of Mathematics
De Leo F (1994) Understanding the Roots of Your Competitive Advantage. From Product/Market
Competition to Competition as a Multiple-Layer Game. In: G Hamel and A Heene (eds) Competence-Based
Competition. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 35–55.
Dewey J (1933) How we think: A restatement of the relation of reflective thinking to the educative process.
Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath.
Eden C and Ackerman F (2000) Mapping distinctive competencies: a systemic approach. Journal of
Operational Research Society 51(1): 12–20.
Ghoshal S (2005) Bad Management Theories Are Destroying Good Management Practices. Academy of
Management Learning & Education 4(1): 75–91.
29
Hafees K, Zhang Y and Malak N (2002) Core Competence for Sustainable Competitive Advantage: A
Structured Methodology for Identifying Core Competence. Transactions on Engineering Management
49(1): 28–35.
Hodgkinson GP, Herriot P and Anderson N (2001) Re-aligning the Stakeholders in Management Research:
Lessons from Industrial, Work and Organizational Psychology. British Journal of Management 12(S1):
41–48.
Ilyenkov EV (1982) Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete in Marx’s Capital. Moscow: Progress.
Also available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/abstract/ (accessed 10 March 2015).
Ilyenkov EV (2007) Our schools should teach how to think. Journal of Russian and East European
Psychology 45 (4):  9–49.
Javidan M (1998) Core Competence: What Does it Mean in Practice? Long Range Planning 31(1): 60–71.
Leontyev AN (1990) [1933] Notes on consciousness. Part II. In Multidisciplinary Newsletter for Activity
Theory 5-6, pp. I – VIII.  
Lewin K (1952) Field theory in social science: Selected theoretical papers by Kurt Lewin. London:
Tavistock.
Ljungquist U (2008) Specification of core competence and associated components. A proposed model and
a case illustration. European Business Review 20(1): 73–90.
Ljungquist U (2013) Adding dynamics to core competence concept applications. European Business
Review 25(5): 453–465.
Luria AR (1976) Cognitive Development, its Cultural and Social Foundations. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press. 
30
Mintzberg H, Raisinghani D and Theoret A (1976) The Structure of “Unstructured” Decision Process.
Administrative Science Quarterly 21(2): 246–275.
Mohrman SA, Gibson CB and Mohrman AM. (2001) Doing research that is useful for practice: A model
and empirical exploration. Academy of Management Journal 44/2: 357–375.
Nicolai AT and Dautwiz JM (2010) Fuzziness in Action: What Consequences Has the Linguistic Ambiguity
of the Core Competence Concept for Organizational Usage? British Journal of Management 21(4): 874–
888.
Nicolai A and Seidl D (2010) That’s Relevant! Different Forms of Practical Relevance in Management
Science. Organization Studies 31(9-10): 1257–1285.
Peteraf MA (1993) The Cornerstones of Competitive Advantage: A Resource-Based View. Strategic
Management Journal 14(3): 179–191.
Prahalad CK and Hamel G (1990) The Core Competence of the Corporation. Harvard Business Review
68(3): 79–91.
Priem RL and Butler JE (2001) Is the Resource-Based “View” a Useful Perspective for Strategic
Management Research? Academy of Management Review 26(1): 22–40.
Rigby D and Bilodeau B (2015) Management Tools & Trends 2015. London: Bain & Company.
Rynes S, Giluk T and Brown K (2007) The very separate world of academic and practitioner periodicals in
human resource management: Implications for evidence-based management. Academy of Management
Journal 50: 987–1008.
31
Spinoza B (1677) On the Improvement of the Understanding [Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione]
Translated by RHM Elwes. Available at:
https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/s/spinoza/benedict/understanding/index.html (accessed 10 March 2015).
Starkey  K  and  Madan  P  (2001)  Bridging  the  Relevance  Gap:  Aligning  Stakeholders  in  the  Future  of
Management Research. British Journal of Management 12(S1): 3–26.
Syed J, Mingers J and Murray PA (2009) Beyond rigour and relevance: A critical Realist Approach to
Business education. Management Learning 41(1): 71–85.
Tolman C (1981) The Metaphysic of Relations in Klaus Riegel’s ‘Dialectics’ of Human Development.
Human Development 24: 33–51.
Van de Ven AH (2007) Engaged Scholarship: A Guide for Organizational and Social Research. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Wernerfelt B (1984) A Resource-Based View of the Firm. Strategic Management Journal 5(2): 171–180.
Whitehead AN (1997) [1925] Science and the Modern World. New York: Macmillan Company.
Whitehead AN (1929) Process and Reality. An Essay in Cosmology. Gifford Lectures Delivered in the
University of Edinburgh During the Session 1927–1928. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zubac A, Hubbard G and Johnson LW (2010) The RBV and value creation: a managerial perspective.
European Business Review 22(5): 515–538.
